3 . 1 . L A W O F D E P L O Y M E N T

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In respect of deployment, extraterritoriality is evidently an appropriate measure.

Optimal deployment requires collectivity to resolve the common pool dilemma.

Consequently, to extend the proceedings so as to include all of the debtor's assets and

liabilities (the entire pool) wherever located is not just appropriate, it is also necessary;

there does not appear to be a less restrictive measure available.1

With regard to the universal application of the lex fori concursus (unity of law) it is

equally clear that it is an appropriate measure to protect the interest of optimal

deployment. However, it does not automatically follow that the universal application

of the lex fori conairsus should also be considered necessary for the purposes 01 the

law of t he freedoms. Arguably it would be less burdensome to interstate trade to apply

the lex concursus ot the Member State in which assets are located; or, more generally,

the lex concursus of the Member State whose law governs the individual debtor-creditor

relationship.

The freedoms require that a measure resulting in an obstacle to trade is necessary in

the sense that there may not be a measure that is less burdensome but equally suitable.

Accordingly, the issue is whether a choice lor the insolvency law other than the lex fori

concursus is equally suitable for the protection of the interest of optimal deployment.

The applicability of an insolvency law other than the lex fori coni -ursus does not by itsell

necessitate additional proceedings nor additional trustees.1"' Nevertheless, the difference

between plurality of proceedings and law and plurality of law alone appears to

be one of degree only. This may be illustrated by the mechanism adopted in the 1980

Draft I 'C Convention on Bankruptcy and similar proceedings in respect of distribution

and priority rights.1 '" The 1980 Draft provided for the creation of sub-estates to be

distributed in accordance with local law. This approach drew considerable criticism

because of its inherent complexity for the liquidator and related costs and is among

the main reasons for the 1 >raft's ultimate failure.1 1 1 This would apply with equal, if not

more, force in respect of deployment. A choice for a lex concursus other than that of

the forum would result in the creation of sub-estates for the purposes of deployment.

Although this may not actually result in a plurality of proceedings, it nevertheless does

not make things any easier for the liquidator nor, indeed, for those who might be

interested in (viable parts of) the estate as a 'going c o n c e r n ' . 1 ' '

It certainly is not impossible to come to effective cross-border insolvency regulation

through plurality. Indeed, the paradigm of modern cross-border insolvency regulation

is to a large extent based on the plurality of both law and forum.1 1 However, if the

question is whether plurality of insolvency law is equally suitable for the protection

 ( i f optim.il deployment as the unitary application of the lex fori eoneurfiif, then the

answer must be in the negative.1 1 1

Again, the tact that the regulatory intensity of universality of insolvency does not

exceed the limits of Community law does not in itself mean that Community law

sanctions the principle of universality to the full extent. Whether or not universality

is in tact obtained equally depends on the question of to what extent other Member

States are to accept universality. This is the question of territoriality and is addressed

in the next chapter.